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Abstract. How strong is the interdependence between the macroeconomy and the stock
market?
This paper estimates a New Keynesian general equilibrium model, which includes a wealth
e®ect from asset price °uctuations to consumption, to assess the quantitative importance of
interactions among the stock market, macroeconomic variables, and monetary policy.
The paper relaxes the assumption of rational expectations and assumes that economic
agents learn over time and form near-rational expectations from their perceived model of the
economy. The stock market, therefore, a®ects the economy through two channels: through a
traditional \wealth e®ect" and through its impact on agents' expectations. Monetary policy
decisions also a®ect and are potentially a®ected by the stock market.
The empirical results show that the direct wealth e®ect is modest, but asset price °uctu-
ations have had important e®ects on output expectations. Shocks in the stock market can
account for a large portion of output °uctuations. The e®ect on expectations, however, has
declined over time.
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1. Introduction
How strong are the links between the macroeconomy and the stock market?
The New Keynesian models that are widely employed to characterize the dynamics of
output and in°ation and to study monetary policy typically abstract from the stock market.
Asset prices, however, can in°uence the economy through a variety of channels. Policy
discussions often emphasize the impact that asset price °uctuations can have on consump-
tion spending decisions: this is the so-called \wealth e®ect". Monetary policy makers may
consider actively responding to asset prices if the wealth channel is sizeable. But the size
of the e®ect is still controversial: although most regressions that have been estimated in
the literature show a positive and signi¯cant causal e®ect of wealth on consumption,
1 recent
studies conclude that the e®ect is smaller than previously thought (Lettau and Ludvigson,
2004, Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2005). Additionally, asset prices can a®ect real activity
trough other channels, such as through a Tobin's Q e®ect on investment and through a
balance sheet/credit channel e®ect.
2
Another central area of interdependence involves the link between asset prices and mon-
etary policy decisions. Researchers have been interested in understanding both whether
monetary policy responds to asset price °uctuations and how strongly the latter are a®ected
by policy shocks (e.g., Rigobon and Sack, 2003, 2004, Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005, Bi¿rnland
and Leitemo, 2008) or other macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g., Chen et al., 1986).
This paper adopts a structural New Keynesian model, which will be estimated on U.S.
data, to infer the strength of the interdependence among macroeconomic variables, monetary
policy, and the stock market. The model, which is based on Nistic¶ o (2005)'s extension of
Blanchard (1985)'s overlapping generations framework, includes a wealth e®ect from asset
prices to consumption, whose magnitude depends on a structural parameter, which a®ects
the length of the households' planning horizon. Current output is a®ected by expectations
of future output, real interest rates, and by current ¯nancial wealth, which is in°uenced by
swings in stock prices. Current stock values depend on their own expected future values, on
expectations about future real activity, and on the ex ante real interest rate.
1Research goes back to Ando and Modigliani (1963); Poterba (2000) and Davis and Palumbo (2001) are
recent surveys.
2This paper will focus on the wealth channel; the Tobin's Q and balance sheet e®ects are, instead, omitted
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In modeling the expectations formation, the paper relaxes the traditional informational
assumptions imposed by rational expectations and it assumes that agents form subjective {
near-rational { expectations and that they attempt to learn the model parameters over time.
Some critics of the conventional wealth channel e®ect have argued that changes in stock
wealth mainly a®ect consumption through changes in expectations and consumer con¯dence,
but no direct wealth e®ect exists.
3 This paper includes both e®ects: a direct wealth e®ect of
asset prices on consumption and output, and an e®ect of asset prices on future expectations.
The estimation tries to empirically disentangle the two e®ects.
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods on monthly U.S. data. The constant gain
coe±cient is jointly estimated with the structural parameters of the economy, so that the
learning process can be extracted from the data, rather than arbitrarily imposed.
1.1. Results. The empirical evidence suggests a small direct wealth e®ect of stock prices
on output. Fluctuations in the stock market, however, a®ect economic agents' expectations
of future real activity. The e®ect has considerably varied over the sample: in the ¯rst half,
economic agents believed changes in the stock market to have a strong e®ect on output,
while they revised their beliefs downward in the second part of the sample.
Through such e®ect on expectations, therefore, the stock market plays an important role
for macroeconomic variables. In the 1960s-1970s, up to 60-70% of °uctuations in the output
gap were explained by shocks that originated in the stock market; the stock market also
acted to amplify the transmission of monetary policy shocks. The importance of stock
market shocks has declined over the sample: in the 1990s-2000s, they typically account for
less than 20% of the variability in output. Fluctuations in the stock price gap were mainly
driven by its own innovations until the 1970s, but they have been increasingly a®ected by
demand shocks afterwards. Monetary policy shocks account for at most 10% of °uctuations
in the stock market and their e®ect has also changed over time.
3Examples are Hymans (1970), who argues that stock market wealth has small e®ects on consumption
after accounting for changes in consumer con¯dence, Otoo (1999), who shows that the relation between
stock prices and consumer con¯dence is counterfactually similar between stock owners and non-owners, and
Jansen and Nahuis (2003), who ¯nd that the short-run impact of changes in the stock market depends on
their e®ect on perceptions about future real activity, rather than personal ¯nances, as would be expected
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The data show that the estimated response of monetary policy to the stock price gap has
been positive if computed over the full sample. But monetary policy has reacted less to
the stock market in the post-1984 sample. Moreover, post-1984 policy has responded to the
stock market only to the extent that it a®ected output and in°ation forecasts: when those
forecasts are included in the policy rule, the estimated reaction to stock prices drops to zero.
1.2. Related Literature. This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the interaction
between the stock market and macroeconomic variables. Their linkages have interested
researchers for a long time (e.g., Fischer and Merton, 1985, for a discussion, Blanchard, 1981,
for an early theoretical analysis), but empirical analysis in a general equilibrium setting are
rare. The paper's main objective, therefore, is to o®er quantitative estimates about the role
of such linkages using a theory-based general equilibrium model.
The paper is closely related to the studies that seek to estimate the wealth e®ect (e.g.,
Poterba, 2000, Davis and Palumbo, 2001, Lettau and Ludvigson, 2004) and to those that
analyze the interaction between asset prices and monetary policy from a positive or normative
perspective (e.g., Rigobon and Sack, 2003, 2004, Bi¿rnland and Leitemo, 2008, Bernanke
and Gertler, 1999, 2001, Cecchetti et al., 2000, and Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002). This paper
provides estimates of the wealth e®ect in a structural model, which permits to control for
general equilibrium e®ects, and it reveals a quantitative important channel through which
asset prices a®ect the economy and which operates through expectations. The paper also
adds to the evidence on the interrelationship between monetary policy and asset prices, by
showing that monetary policy has reacted to stock prices (but, after Volcker, not beyond
their role as leading indicators), that stock prices are a®ected by policy shocks, and that
both e®ects seem to have weakened over time.
Finally, the paper is related to the countless empirical studies using the New Keynesian
model, as it hints that the typical omission of stock market variables may represent an
important misspeci¯cation of the model, to the empirical studies that replace rational ex-
pectations with adaptive learning (e.g., Adam, 2005, Milani 2007, 2008, Orphanides and
Williams, 2003, Primiceri, 2006), and to the studies that illustrate how learning can help
in explaining asset price dynamics (e.g., Timmermann, 1993, Guidolin and Timmermann,
2007, Adam et al., 2007, and Branch and Evans, 2007).4 FABIO MILANI
2. A Model with Wealth Effects
2.1. Households. The model is based on Nistic¶ o (2005), who extends Blanchard (1985)
and Yaari (1965)'s perpetual youth models to include risky equities and adapts it to a New
Keynesian framework.
4 An inde¯nite number of cohorts populate the economy. Each cohort
may survive in any period with probability (1¡°), which may be more generally interpreted
as the probability of remaining active in the market.5






t [³t log(Cj;t) + log(1 ¡ Nj;t)] (2.1)
where Cj;t denotes an index of consumption goods, Nj;t indicates hours worked, and ³t is
an aggregate preference shock. Consumers discount utility at the rate 0 · ¯ · 1, which
denotes the usual intertemporal discount factor, and 1 ¡ °, where 0 · ° · 1, to account
for their limited lifespan. Consumers can invest in two types of ¯nancial assets: bonds and
equity shares, which are issued by ¯rms, to which they also supply labor.6 Their portfolio,
therefore, consists of a set of state-contingent assets with payo® Bj;t+1 in t + 1, which they
discount using the stochastic discount factor Ft;t+1, and equity shares Zj;t+1(i) issued by ¯rm
i at the real price Qt(i) and on which they receive dividends Dt(i).






Qt(i)Zj;t+1(i)di · WtNj;t ¡ PtTj;t + ­j;t (2.2)
where Pt is the aggregate price level, (WtNj;t ¡ PtTj;t) is net labor income, ¯nancial wealth

















k­j;t+kg = 0: (2.4)
4A sketch of the model is presented here; the reader is referred to Nistic¶ o (2005) for a detailed step-by-step
derivation.
5Therefore, 1=° can be interpreted as the households' time horizon when taking consumption and ¯nancial
decisions. The size of the cohort remains ¯xed, since by assumption a fraction ° of the total population is
born and dies every period.
6The economy is \cashless" as in Woodford (2003).LEARNING, THE MACROECONOMY, AND THE STOCK MARKET 5
Financial wealth ­j;t not only includes the portfolio of contingent claims and equity shares,
but also, following Blanchard (1985), the return on the insurance contract that redistributes
among surviving cohorts the ¯nancial wealth of those that have exited the market.7
2.2. Firms. There are i monopolistically-competitive ¯rms in the economy, which produce
a continuum of di®erentiated goods and set prices µ a la Calvo: therefore, only a fraction
0 < 1 ¡ ® < 1 of ¯rms are allowed to set an optimal price in a given period. Firm
i is a monopolistic supplier of good i, which is produced according to the production
technology yt(i) = AtNt(i), where At is an exogenous aggregate technology shock and
Nt(i) ´
Pt
j=¡1 °(1 ¡ °)t¡jNj;t(i) is labor input, aggregated across cohorts. Firms face





for their product, where Yt is the aggregate







, where µ > 1 is the elasticity among di®erentiated
goods. Each ¯rm faces the same decision problem and, if allowed to re-optimize, sets the
common price p¤











where ¦t+k (¢) denotes ¯rm's nominal pro¯ts in period t + k.
2.3. Aggregate Dynamics. Log-linearization of the model ¯rst-order conditions around
a zero-in°ation steady state gives the following equations, which summarize the aggregate










(it ¡ b Et¼t+1 ¡ r
n
t ) (2.6)
st = e ¯ b Etst+1 + ¸b Etxt+1 ¡ (it ¡ b Et¼t+1 ¡ r
n
t ) + et (2.7)
¼t = e ¯ b Et¼t+1 + ·xt + ut (2.8)
it = ½it¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)[(1 + Â¼)¼t¡1 + Âxxt¡1 + Âsst¡1] + "t (2.9)
where xt denotes the output gap, st denotes the real stock price gap,8 ¼t denotes in°ation,
it denotes the short-term nominal interest rate, and b Et stands for subjective near-rational
7This is why ¯nancial wealth is multiplied by 1
1¡°.
8The output gap is given by the deviation of total output Yt from Y n
t , the natural level of output, i.e. the
equilibrium level of output under °exible prices. Similarly the real stock price gap is de¯ned as st ´ qt ¡qn
t ,
where qt is the real stock price and qn
t is the corresponding °exible-price equilibrium level.6 FABIO MILANI
expectations.9 Four disturbances a®ect the economy: rn
t denotes the natural rate of interest,
et is a shock that originates in the stock market and that can be rationalized as an equity
premium shock (as done in Nistic¶ o, 2005) or can account for °uctuations in asset prices that
are not linked to fundamentals (e.g. bubbles, \irrational exuberance", fads, etc.),10 ut is a
cost-push shock, and "t is a monetary policy shock.
Equation (2.6) represents the log-linearized intertemporal Euler equation that derives from
the households' optimal choice of consumption. As in the standard optimizing IS equation
in the New Keynesian model, the output gap depends on the expected one-period-ahead
output gap and on the ex ante real interest rate. The novelty in the model is the inclusion
of a wealth channel, i.e. a direct e®ect of stock price °uctuations on the output gap, which
depends on the size of the reduced-form coe±cient
Ã
1+Ã. The coe±cient Ã is a combination





PC denotes the steady-state real ¯nancial
wealth to consumption ratio. The magnitude of Ã and hence the magnitude of the wealth
e®ect positively depends on the structural parameter °, which as seen in (2.1), denotes the
span of the agents' planning horizon. A high survival probability { or equivalently a long
planning horizon (i.e. a low °) { implies a weaker wealth e®ect. Also, a shorter planning
horizon reduces the degree of consumption smoothing and the responsiveness of consumption
to the real interest rate.
The stock-price dynamics is characterized by equation (2.7). Stock prices are forward-
looking: the stock price gap depends on its own one-period ahead expectations, on expec-
tations about future output gap, on the ex-ante real interest rate, and on the stock market
shock.11
9As customary in the adaptive learning literature, near-rational expectations are assumed starting from
the same log-linearized conditions that would be obtained under rational expectations.
10Learning may potentially generate endogenous bubbles in the model (e.g., Branch and Evans, 2008);
the disturbance term et, however, captures exogenous bubbles that are not rationalized by such learning
dynamics. Unmodeled changes in the stock market risk premium will also end up in et.
11In Nistic¶ o (2005) and Airaudo, Nistic¶ o, and Zanna (2007), the composite coe±cient ¸ ´ (
1+'
¹¡1¡1), which
depends on the steady-state markup ¹ = µ
µ¡1 and on the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ',
is negative: expectations of future expansions imply lower stock prices. This might be seen as contrary to
what commonly thought and hinges on the assumption of a °exible labor market (which in the model would
generate countercyclical pro¯ts and dividends, which is at odds with the evidence). In this paper, I assume
marginal costs that can deviate from the value implied by the °exible labor market assumption, by allowing
for labor rigidities as in Blanchard and Gal¶ ³ (2007). The coe±cients ¸ now becomes equal to (
(1¡±)(1+')
(¹¡1) ¡1),
which can be positive or negative, and where (1 ¡ ±) accounts for the rigidity. The relationship between
marginal cost and the output gap is potentially attenuated. Although admittedly ad hoc, for the purposesLEARNING, THE MACROECONOMY, AND THE STOCK MARKET 7
Equation (2.8) is the forward-looking New-Keynesian Phillips curve. In°ation depends on
expected in°ation in t+1 and on current output gap. The parameter · denotes the slope of
the Phillips curve and negatively depends on ®, the Calvo price stickiness parameter.
Equation (2.9) describes monetary policy. The central bank follows a Taylor rule by
adjusting its policy instrument, a short-term nominal interest rate, in response to changes




t, while ½ accounts for interest-rate smoothing.
An advantage of this framework is that it permits to deal with interactions between
macroeconomic variables and the stock market by maintaining a parsimonious structure,
which potentially allows large wealth e®ects and nests the standard New Keynesian model
as special case.13 The evidence from this paper can be seen as complementary to that coming
from `¯nancial accelerator' models as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) or Gilchrist
and Saito (2007), which emphasize a di®erent channel through which ¯nancial variables can
a®ect the economy.
2.4. Expectations. The paper relaxes the assumption of rational expectations, by assuming
that economic agents form near-rational expectations and learn about economic relationships
over time (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2007, for a survey of the literature on learning models).
Agents are assumed to use a linear model as their Perceived Law of Motion
Zt = at + btZt¡1 + ²t (2.10)
where Zt ´ [xt;st;¼t;it]0, at is a 4 £ 1 vector and bt is a 4 £ 4 matrix of coe±cients. Agents
are assumed not to know the relevant model parameters and they use historical data to
learn them over time. Each period, they update their estimates of at and bt according to the
of the paper, this assumption permits to avoid biases in the results that are due to imprecisions in modeling
the labor market. A previous version of the paper, however, was estimated under °exible labor markets and
delivered similar results.
12Monetary policy is assumed to react to the stock price gap, not to the level. This is similar to Nistic¶ o
(2005) and Gilchrist and Saito (2007). The estimation results remained comparable when policy responds
to st rather than to st¡1.
13The model is mostly aimed at studying the in°uence of stock prices on the main macroeconomic variables
that matter for monetary policy; the model, however, cannot provide the best possible characterization
of stock price dynamics, since that would likely involve second-order terms, which are here lost in the
linearization.8 FABIO MILANI
constant-gain learning formula
b Át = b Át¡1 + gR
¡1
t Xt(Zt ¡ X
0
tb Át¡1) (2.11)
Rt = Rt¡1 + g(XtX
0
t ¡ Rt¡1) (2.12)
where (2.11) describes the updating of the learning rule coe±cients collected in b Át = (a0
t;vec(bt)0)
0,
and (2.12) characterizes the updating of the precision matrix Rt of the stacked regressors
Xt ´ f1;xt¡1;st¡1;¼t¡1;it¡1g
t¡1
0 . g denotes the constant gain coe±cient. Economic agents
are assumed to use only observables in their perceived model: they do not know, instead,
the realizations of the unobservable shocks.14
3. Estimation
The vector £ collects the coe±cients that need to be estimated:
£ = f°;¸;·;½;Â¼;Âx;Âs;b g;½r;½e;½u;¾r;¾e;¾u;¾"g (3.1)
I use monthly data on industrial production, the S&P 500 stock price index, the CPI, and
the federal funds rate. The output gap xt is computed by detrending the log of the industrial
production series using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter. The real stock price gap st is calculated
as the S&P 500 index de°ated using the CPI and then detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott
¯lter.15 In°ation ¼t is constructed as the monthly change in the CPI, and the Federal Funds
rate it is taken in levels and converted to monthly units.16 Figure 1 displays the output and
stock price gap series. The stock price gap is about four times more volatile than the output
gap. Booms and busts in the stock market anticipate economic expansions and recessions:
14Adding learning in the model results in a number of advantages. The relationship between stock prices
and macroeconomic variables may have not been stable over time: learning allows the model to incorporate
the time variation in a parsimonious way. As in Milani (2007), learning introduces lags in the model,
without the need to change the microfoundations { by assuming habit formation in consumption or in°ation
indexation, for example { thereby helping in capturing the persistence in the data.
15Obviously, the empirical measures for the output and stock price gap obtained by detrending the data
with the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter may not correspond to the theoretical de¯nitions of deviations from their
corresponding °exible price level. The °exible price potential stock price level in the model would be strictly
connected to the °exible price potential output: I have preferred not to impose this restriction on the data
and focus on a more data-driven decomposition.
16The series on industrial production, the CPI, and the Federal Funds rate were downloaded from FRED,
the Federal Reserve Economic Database, hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Industrial
production is the Industrial Production Index, Seasonally Adjusted (INDPRO), CPI is the Consumer Price
Index for all Urban Consumers, All Items, Seasonally Adjusted (CPIAUCSL), the Federal Funds Rate is
the E®ective Federal Funds Rate, in percent, average of daily ¯gures (FEDFUNDS). The S&P 500 was
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essentially all recessions in the sample have been preceded by a fall in the stock price gap
(as known, however, not all stock market busts develop into a recession). The relation
between the two series appears attenuated starting from the early 1980s (for instance, the
cross-correlation between the output gap and the stock price gap lagged eight months goes
from 0.66 in the pre-1979 sample to 0.13 in the post-1984 sample).
In the estimation, I consider a sample from 1960:M1 to 2007:M8. To initialize the learning
algorithm in (2.11) and (2.12), I use pre-sample data from 1951:M1 to 1959:M1 (estimating
(2.10) by OLS over this period).
The model is estimated by likelihood-based Bayesian methods to ¯t the output gap, real
stock price gap, in°ation, and Federal Funds rate series. The estimation technique follows
Milani (2007), who extends the approach described in An and Schorfheide (2007) to permit
the estimation of DSGE models with near-rational expectations and learning by economic
agents. The results may depend on the assumed learning dynamics, if this is imposed a
priori. Therefore, here, I instead estimate also the learning process (which depends on
the constant gain coe±cient) jointly with the rest of structural parameters of the economy.
In this way, the best-¯tting learning process is extrapolated from the data along with the
best-¯tting preference and policy parameters.
I use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate draws from the posterior distribution.
At each iteration, the likelihood is evaluated using the Kalman ¯lter. I consider 300,000
draws, discarding the ¯rst 25% as initial burn-in.
The priors for the model parameters are described in Table 1. I assume a noninformative
Uniform [0,1] prior for °, the main parameter of interest, which a®ects the size of the wealth
e®ect. I assume prior Gamma distributions for the slope of the Phillips curve · and for
the monetary policy feedback coe±cients to in°ation and output gap. I assume, instead, a
Normal prior with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.15 for the policy feedback to the stock
price gap and with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.25 for ¸. I also assume a Gamma prior
distribution for the constant gain coe±cient. Finally, Beta distributions are used for the
autoregressive coe±cients and Inverse Gamma distributions for the standard deviations of
the shocks.17




= 0:9967, while the real ¯nancial wealth to consumption ratio in steady-state ­ is ¯xed to10 FABIO MILANI
4. Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the posterior estimates for the baseline model, summarized by equations
(2.6) to (2.9), with expectations formed using (2.10), (2.11), and (2.12). Table 3 displays the
estimates for a selection of alternative cases. Table 4 and Figures 4 to 8 present the outcome
of selected impulse response functions and variance decompositions, which are time-varying
in the model as a consequence of learning dynamics.
4.1. How Large is the Wealth E®ect? The data indicate a low value for the probability
of exiting the market parameter °. The mean posterior estimate equals 0.0084, which implies
a decision planning horizon of 1=° = 119 months, or 10 years. The implied wealth e®ect
from changes in asset prices on output, measured by the composite reduced-form parameter
Ã
1+Ã is extremely small: the 95% highest posterior density interval does not contain values
higher than 0.0025. The estimate for ° implies that the degree of consumption smoothing
and the sensitivity of output to the real interest rate remain high and close to the level they
would assume in the nested case of a New Keynesian model with no wealth e®ect.
Turning to the other parameters, the posterior mean for the constant gain coe±cient equals
0.014, which is lower, but not far from the value estimated in Milani (2007) on quarterly
data. The sensitivity of the stock price gap to output expectations ¸ has posterior mean
0.09, but the estimate is characterized by large uncertainty (the 95% HPD contains values
between -0.11 and 0.29). The monthly Phillips curve is relatively °at (· = 0:008).
The estimated autoregressive parameters for the shocks are moderate: this shows that
learning can account for most of the persistence in the model, so that strongly serially-
correlated exogenous shocks are not necessary.
4.1.1. Post-1984 Sample. The rate of equity ownership (direct or indirect through mutual
funds) has doubled from below a quarter in the 1970s to more than half in the 1990s (see
Duca, 2006). It is, therefore, possible that the size of the wealth e®ect has increased in the
second part of the sample, since a larger fraction of the population can be now a®ected by
swings in asset values. The estimates for the post-1984 sample (Table 3), however, indicate
4 (this value is consistent with the information in the Households Balance Sheet in the Federal Reserve
System's Flow of Funds accounts).LEARNING, THE MACROECONOMY, AND THE STOCK MARKET 11
a posterior mean for ° equal to 0.009, which remains substantially at the same level as the
full-sample result.18
When the model is estimated assuming that stock prices do not a®ect the formation of
expectations, the posterior mean for °, in the full sample case, becomes larger (° = 0:033,
Table 3). The ¯t of the model, however, would be worse.
4.2. Evolving Economic Agents' Beliefs. Figure 2 illustrates the evolving beliefs by
economic agents about the coe±cient b12;t, which refers to the perceived e®ect of stock prices
on the output gap. Agents appear to use information in the stock market when forming
expectations about future output: the e®ect on their expectations, however, declines over
the sample.
Figure 3 provides some supportive evidence that such behavior is consistent with what
a rational forecaster would do. Economic agents that use information in stock prices to
forecast future output gaps obtain much lower root mean squared error in the early part of
the sample and for most of the 1970s compared with forecasters that exclude asset prices
from their perceived model. Their forecasting performances become very similar at the end
of the sample (when, in fact, learning agents start to believe that stock prices have only a
small e®ect on output). If agents had kept their initial belief of a large in°uence of the stock
market on the economy, retaining their 1965 estimate of b12 over the whole sample (that is
b12;t = 0:056 for all t's), they would have done well until the 1970s, but poorly starting from
1985. This evidence is consistent with Stock and Watson (2003)'s ¯nding that asset prices
are useful in forecasting for some periods, but not others.
Turning to the other beliefs, I ¯nd that the intercept and the autoregressive parameter in
the in°ation equation are revised upward in the middle of the sample and decline again later
on. The perceived degree of monetary policy inertia jumps after 1979. In the stock price
equation, the perceived stock price persistence declines over time, while its sensitivity to the
real interest rate is stronger in the late 1960s and 1970s.19
18Estimates of the wealth e®ect appear stable over sub-samples. This ¯nding di®ers from the evidence
of sub-sample instability detected by Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), who estimate a much larger e®ect
before 1985 than afterwards. Such instability may easily re°ect changes in the impact of stock prices on
expectations, more than a decline of the direct wealth e®ect over time.
19The full set of plots will be available in the online version of the paper at
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/ fmilani/Stock.pdf.12 FABIO MILANI
4.3. Do Stock Market Shocks Matter? As evidenced from the estimation, the direct
wealth e®ect of short-run stock price changes on output is close to zero. Is the stock market
hence irrelevant for output °uctuations?
In the model, asset prices a®ect the economy through a second e®ect, by leading economic
agents to revise their expectations. This channel seems more important from the estimation,
although the e®ect has varied over the sample.20
I investigate the importance of stock prices on the economy by looking at the variance
decomposition over the sample. Figure 4 reports the percentage of variance in the output gap
that is explained by shocks in the stock price gap variable, shown across forecast horizons
(from one month to ten years) and over time.
Shocks in the stock market play a signi¯cant role in explaining output °uctuations. In
several periods in the 1960s and 1970s, up to 60-70% of output °uctuations are due to stock
price shocks. The stock market appears to play a more limited role in the second half of
the sample, the 1990s and 2000s: output °uctuations are due in large part to shocks in the
natural interest rate and usually to less than 20% to stock market shocks.21
Figure 5 exhibits the impulse response of the output gap to a stock price shock as it varies
over the sample. In the early part of the sample and until the early 1980s, stock market
shocks induce a sharp increase in output that lasts about a year, before falling below its
initial level and reverting to zero in less than three years. The e®ect becomes much smaller
in the second half of the sample. In°ation is also a®ected by stock market shocks: the
e®ect is larger in the 1970s (¯gure 6). These shocks explain, on average, around 10% of the
variance in in°ation (Table 4).
Bi¿rnland and Leitemo (2008) discuss how stock price shocks that produce a permanent
e®ect on output may be interpreted as \news" shock, while shocks that produce only a
transitory e®ect are more evocative of sunspot shocks. As them, I ¯nd only transitory e®ects
20The e®ect of stock prices through expectations, rather than through a direct wealth channel, is consistent
with the microeconometric evidence that uncovers a similar consumption response between households that
own or do not own equities to stock price changes (e.g., Otoo, 1999).
21Doan, Litterman, and Sims (2003), in a paper with unrelated focus, ¯nd similar evidence that stock
price shocks are important in a structural VAR on data up to 1983. The percentage of variance they explain
amounts to 30-40% after 1960 and it was already declining from more than 60% in their 1948:M7-1960:M1
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on output: these results seem to con¯rm, in a structural model, Bi¿rnland and Leitemo's
¯nding that stock price shocks may be better understood as non-fundamental sunspots.
But why has the role of stock market shocks faded over time?
One possible interpretation is that economic agents slowly learned over the sample and
are converging to the true estimate of a wealth channel close to zero.
Maybe more likely, the decline in the stock market e®ects on the real economy may be
related to the \Great Moderation". The standard deviation of the output gap measure
has fallen from 2.68 before 1984 to 1.24 afterwards, while the standard deviation of the
stock price gap did not experience a similar decline (it went from 8.61 to 6.60). The stock
market has remained volatile, but the volatility of asset price °uctuations has not translated
into macroeconomic volatility. The improved monetary policy, which is one of the major
candidates as driver of the Great Moderation, may have induced agents to expect small
deviations of output from potential and, therefore, it may have reduced the usefulness of
asset prices in forecasting the output gap.
4.3.1. Stock Market and the Propagation of Shocks. The stock market, mainly through its
e®ect on expectations, plays also a signi¯cant role in propagating non-¯nancial shocks. Figure
7 displays the mean impulse responses, across sub-samples, of the output gap to a monetary
policy shock for the baseline model and for an alternative model in which the e®ect of stock
prices on expectations is shut down. In periods when economic agents give a relatively large
weight to stock prices in their forecasting model, the stock market considerably ampli¯es
the propagation of monetary policy shocks (this is evident in the 1960s and 1970s). A
monetary contraction, in fact, depresses both output and stock prices, which in turn, through
their e®ect on expectations, cause an even larger reduction in output. The initial e®ect is,
therefore, magni¯ed. The role of the stock market, however, varies over the sample. In the
1984-1999 sub-sample, the model that allows for stock price e®ects on expectations displays
an attenuated and more transient response (this is mostly due to a perceived negative e®ect
of past output on current stock prices in this period, which weakens the original output
e®ect). Finally, when agents' beliefs assign a small weight to asset prices in their perceived
law of motion (as in the 2000-2007 period), the impulse responses with or without stock
price e®ects are virtually indistinguishable.14 FABIO MILANI
If the stock market channel is entirely shut down, demand shocks would pick up most of
the e®ect of stock price shocks in explaining output °uctuations (their importance rises to
60% in the ¯rst half and 75% in the second half). Monetary policy shocks would also matter
more and they would account for a larger part of the variation in in°ation.
4.4. Does Monetary Policy React to Stock Market Fluctuations? The full-sample
estimates indicate that monetary policy has responded to the stock price gap. The posterior
mean estimate for Âs in table 2 equals 0.139.
The feedback to the stock price gap is much lower (Âs = 0:034) in the post-1984 sample:
this is consistent with the reduced in°uence of stock prices on output expectations and with
the common perception that Fed's policy under Greenspan did not react to the bubble in the
1990s. Moreover, if the estimation is repeated using a Taylor rule that responds to forecasts
of in°ation and the output gap (i.e., to b Et¼t+1 and b Etxt+1, assuming that the Fed uses the
same forecasting model (2.10) as the private sector), rather than to their lagged values, the
response to the stock price gap is quite precisely estimated around zero (and the model ¯t
improves). This signals that policy reacts to stock prices only to the extent that they act as
leading indicators of future in°ation and real activity, but no separate response exists.22
Recent papers ¯nd that if central banks react to asset prices, they may increase the
chances of indeterminacy in the economy. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) ¯nd determinacy
only if the response to asset prices remains below a certain threshold. Airaudo et al. (2007),
in the same model used in this paper, study determinacy and learnability conditions. They
similarly show that a positive reaction to the stock price gap may enlarge the indeterminacy
region. Indeterminacy is also more likely when ° is close to 0, as estimated in this paper.
The post-1984 estimates, however, indicate that Federal Reserve policy, by not actively
targeting stock prices, has likely been conducive to determinacy and E-stability.
4.5. The E®ect of Monetary Policy and Macro Shocks on Stock Prices. Figure 8
presents the impulse responses of the stock price gap to one-standard-deviation monetary
policy, demand, and supply shocks. Stock prices seem more responsive to monetary policy
surprises in the 1960-1970s: a contractionary shock leads to a decline in stock prices with a
22Fuhrer and Tootell (2008) similarly ¯nd little evidence of an independent response to stock values when
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negative peak seven months after the shock. The decline would be even more pronounced
if examined on 1970s data alone. The response in the latest part of the sample, instead,
is much smaller (the plotted response, however, conceals some variation that exists in the
post-1984 period).23 This may suggest a recent more limited e®ect of monetary policy, but
it might also re°ect the di±culty in identifying monetary policy shocks in the second part
of the sample on monthly data (responses that may be found on high-frequency data may
have become extremely short-lived and may be lost in the monthly averaging).
Shocks in the natural interest rate lead to an immediate jump in the stock price gap, which
turns negative after six-eight months, before reverting to zero. In°ationary shocks lead to a
decline in the stock price gap, with a less sluggish adjustment in the post-1984 sample.
Table 4 reports the outcome of the forecast error variance decomposition at alternative
horizons. Regarding the stock price gap, in the 1960-1970s, monetary policy shocks ac-
counted for up to 7.5% of the variance, demand shocks for 6.2%. Fluctuations in the stock
market are mostly driven by shocks that originate in the stock market. In the second half
of the sample, monetary policy shocks account for up to 9.7% of °uctuations, and demand
shocks for more than 20%: the stock market hence appears not as isolated from the rest of
the economy as in the past.
5. Conclusions
The paper has provided evidence from a structural model on the empirical relevance
of interactions between macroeconomic variables and the stock market. One of the main
channels that are usually emphasized in policy discussions, the wealth channel, appears
modest. But the stock market plays a signi¯cant role through its impact on expectations
about future real activity.
Monetary policy seems to have reacted to stock price °uctuations, but, in the post-1984
sample, only to the extent that they in°uence output and in°ation forecasts. A monetary
policy response may be justi¯ed if non-rational movements in the stock market a®ect expec-
tations, as found in the data, and if non-fundamental stock market shocks are an important
source of °uctuations. But both these e®ects are now less important. Still, the welfare
23The small response may be consistent with Davig and Gerlach (2007)'s estimate of a distinct regime in
the late 1990s-early 2002, in which stock prices' response to policy shocks is insigni¯cant and volatile.16 FABIO MILANI
implications of di®erent monetary policy rules in a model in which asset prices a®ect private
sector's expectations and learning is an important topic that deserves future study.
The stock market dynamics is a®ected by macroeconomic fundamentals, but a large part
of °uctuations is due to non-fundamental stock price shocks. A better modeling of the stock
market, which retains second-order terms, will be needed to shed more light on the nature
of ¯nancial shocks (Challe and Giannitsarou, 2007, o®er a general equilibrium framework in
this direction). Future extensions should also move away from the linear/Gaussian frame-
work: including stochastic volatility in the structural innovations, for example, would allow
researchers to study the relation between output and stock price volatility, as well as be-
tween expectations of future booms and busts and volatility. Finally, it is necessary to check
whether the evidence is robust to the use of a larger model and the inclusion of di®erent
¯nancial sector channels: in this respect, Christiano et al. (2008)'s ¯ndings, in a di®erent
framework, similarly identify an important role for ¯nancial shocks.LEARNING, THE MACROECONOMY, AND THE STOCK MARKET 17
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Prior Distribution
Description Parameter Distr. Support Prior Mean 95% Prior Prob. Interval
Prob. of Leaving the Mkt. ° U [0,1] 0.5 [0.025,0.975]
Elast. Subst. Di®erent. Goods µ ¡ R+ 12 [3.26,26.13]
Slope PC · ¡ R+ 0.25 [0.03,0.70]
MP Inertia ½ B [0,1] 0.8 [0.459,0.985]
MP In°ation feedback Â¼ ¡ R+ 0.5 [0.06,1.40]
MP Output Gap feedback Âx ¡ R+ 0.25 [0.03,0.70]
MP Stock Price Gap feedback Âs N R 0 [-0.29,0.29]
Std. Demand Shock ¾r ¡¡1 R+ 0.11 [0.038,0.31]
Std. Stock Price Shock ¾e ¡¡1 R+ 0.33 [0.11,0.92]
Std. Supply Shock ¾u ¡¡1 R+ 0.11 [0.038,0.31]
Std. MP Shock ¾" ¡¡1 R+ 0.11 [0.038,0.31]
Autoregr. coe®. rN
t ½r B [0,1] 0.8 [0.459,0.985]
Autoregr. coe®. eN
t ½e B [0,1] 0.8 [0.459,0.985]
Autoregr. coe®. ut ½u B [0,1] 0.8 [0.459,0.985]
Constant Gain g ¡ R+ 0.031 [0.003,0.087]
Table 1 - Prior Distributions.
(U= Uniform, N= Normal, ¡= Gamma, B= Beta, ¡¡1= Inverse Gamma)20 FABIO MILANI
Posterior Distribution
Description Parameter Posterior Mean 95% HPD
Prob. of Leaving the Mkt. ° 0:0084
(0:006)
[0.0004,0.023]
Sensit. Stock Prices to Output ¸ 0:09
(0:10)
[-0.11,0.29]
Slope PC · 0:008
(0:004)
[0.001,0.017]
MP Inertia ½ 0:986
(0:004)
[0.977,0.994]
MP In°ation feedback 1 + Â¼ 1:39
(0:20)
[1.11,1.91]
MP Output Gap feedback Âx 0:19
(0:09)
[0.05,0.43]
MP Stock Price Gap feedback Âs 0:135
(0:05)
[0.06, 0.265]
Std. Demand Shock ¾r 0:76
(0:02)
[0.71,0.80]
Std. Stock Price Shock ¾e 4:15
(0:13)
[3.90,4.42]
Std. Supply Shock ¾u 0:22
(0:01)
[0.21,0.24]







Autoregr. coe®. et ½e 0:24
(0:04)
[0.16,0.32]
Autoregr. coe®. ut ½u 0:21
(0:04)
[0.13,0.28]








Table 2 - Posterior Estimates.
Full Sample 1960:M1-2007:M7, Baseline Case. The table shows the posterior mean (standard deviation
in brackets) and the 95% Highest Posterior Density Interval.LEARNING, THE MACROECONOMY, AND THE STOCK MARKET 21
Post-1984 Sample Taylor rule with Expect. No E®ect of st on Expect.


















































































































Table 3 - Posterior Estimates: Alternative Models.
The table shows the posterior mean, standard deviations, and the 95% Highest Posterior Density Interval.
The second and third column refer to the estimate for the 1984:M1-2007:M7 sample, the fourth and ¯fth
column to the 1984:M1-2007:M7 sample using a model with a Taylor rule that responds to expected in°ation
and output gap it = ½it¡1 +(1 ¡½)[(1+ Â¼) b Et¼t+1 +Âx b Etxt+1 +Âsst¡1]+ "t, the sixth and seventh to the
full-sample estimation of a model in which the stock price gap st is assumed not to a®ect economic agents'
expectations in (2.10).22 FABIO MILANI
Horizon MP Shock rN
t Shock Stock Market Shock In°ation Shock
Pre-1979 Post-1984 Pre-1979 Post-1984 Pre-1979 Post-1984 Pre-1979 Post-1984
Output Gap 6 0.027 0.020 0.606 0.856 0.358 0.109 0.002 0.013
24 0.156 0.133 0.425 0.726 0.408 0.129 0.004 0.012
1 0.162 0.257 0.402 0.569 0.426 0.162 0.005 0.012
Stock Price Gap 6 0.034 0.004 0.028 0.125 0.930 0.861 0.001 0.009
24 0.074 0.039 0.062 0.222 0.856 0.726 0.003 0.011
1 0.075 0.097 0.062 0.212 0.855 0.676 0.003 0.011
In°ation 6 0.038 0.01 0.024 0.067 0.058 0.052 0.874 0.869
24 0.049 0.028 0.034 0.096 0.125 0.075 0.786 0.798
1 0.050 0.060 0.035 0.10 0.128 0.09 0.781 0.759
FFR 6 0.742 0.818 0.043 0.040 0.199 0.127 0.009 0.014
24 0.429 0.651 0.072 0.107 0.483 0.227 0.009 0.014
1 0.421 0.635 0.072 0.120 0.492 0.231 0.009 0.013















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Output Gap Real Stock Price Gap
Figure 1. Output Gap and Real Stock Price Gap series. Note: the series are
expressed in percentage deviations from potential; the left scale refers to the output gap,
right scale to the stock price gap. The light-yellow shaded areas denote NBER recession
dates.24 FABIO MILANI











Figure 2. Agents' Beliefs: Perceived Sensitivity of the Output Gap to Stock
Price Gap Movements. Note: The solid line denotes the posterior mean of beliefs across
Metropolis-Hastings draws. The dotted lines denote the 2.5% and 95% error bands.LEARNING, THE MACROECONOMY, AND THE STOCK MARKET 25












Baseline case with learning
No effect of stock prices on expectations
Constant effect of stock prices on expectations (as in 1965)
Figure 3. Rolling Root Mean Squared Error. Note: The graphs shows the rolling
RMSE calculated using a window of 60 observations (for the ¯rst ¯ve years, the RMSE is
recursively calculated. The baseline case refers to the agents' PLM in (2.10), the second
assuming a zero e®ect of the real stock price gap in the agents' PLM, the third assuming a
constant (large) e®ect of the stock price gap on output expectations, which is ¯xed at the
agents' belief in 1965 (i.e., b12 = 0:056)26 FABIO MILANI
Figure 4. Variance Decomposition: Variance of the output gap, xt, due to





















Figure 5. Impulse Response Function of the Output Gap to a one-standard-
deviation Stock Price Gap Shock, shown across horizons and over the sample.28 FABIO MILANI

























Figure 6. Impulse Response Functions of the Output Gap and In°ation to
one-standard-deviation Stock Price Gap Shocks.LEARNING, THE MACROECONOMY, AND THE STOCK MARKET 29
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Figure 7. Impulse Response Functions of the Output Gap to a one-standard-
deviation Monetary Policy Shock. Note: The solid line denotes the impulse responses
in the baseline estimated model, which includes a direct wealth e®ect and allows for an e®ect
of stock prices on expectations. The dashed line refers to an alternative model, in which the
e®ect of stock prices on expectations is shut down.30 FABIO MILANI
Figure 8. Impulse Response Functions of the Real Stock Price Gap to one-
standard-deviation Monetary Policy, Natural Rate, Stock Market, and Cost-
Push Shocks.